Vilken typ av organisation är Hizbollah?

Det är ingen terroristorganisation (att definiera vad det innebär är dock inte helt lätt). Det är ett massbaserat borgerligt parti med en mängd parlamentsledamöter och organisationen är erkänd av alla grupper i Libanon som en legitim politisk kraft, precis som Piers Mostyn skrev i International Viewpoint i samband med Israels krig i Libanon år 2006:

Hizbollah is not a “terrorist” organisation, whatever that is. It is a mass movement with dozens of MPs and ministers in the national government. This government is a coalition that straddles all sections of Lebanese society – meaning that the party is accepted as a legitimate democratic entity by nearly all strands of that society, whatever the disagreements over politics or religion. It is a resistance movement that owes it’s origins to the 1982 Israeli invasion of the country (which involved the notorious Sabra and Shatilla refugee camp massacres organised by Olmert’s predecessor as PM and political mentor, Ariel Sharon) and 18 years of occupation. Its legitimacy stems from its role in resisting this occupation and finally driving Israel out – in the context of the unwillingness or inability of other forces in Lebanon or the Arab world to take action.

As socialists in favour of secularism in politics, we cannot give political support to Hizbollah given its religious character. Nonetheless, like Hamas it is strongly rooted in and serves a community that is religious. Like Hamas it is often wrongly characterised as “fundamentalist” when it has nothing in common with Taliban-style politics. It has, by its actions, shown willing to work with other forces for the unity of a multi-confessional Lebanon.

Whilst reserving the right to criticise its politics and tactics, we nonetheless call for socialists, anti-imperialists and anti-war activists to show unconditional solidarity with its resistance to Israel’s murderous attack and other attempts to interfere with the right of the Lebanese people to free self-determination.

Förhållandet mellan den libanesiska vänstern och Hizbollah beskrivs så här av den libanesiskfödde aktivisten och professorn Gilbert Achcar (också från 2006, regeringssituationen är ju förändrad sen dess):

The Lebanese Communist Party (LCP) is a shadow of its former self, of what it used to be in the 70s and 80s. It was one of the most important Communist Parties in the Arab world, relative to the size of the country, and one of the major actors in the civil war of 1975-1990. The LCP was the first to launch attacks against the Israeli occupation in 1982, after the invasion settled down, in the name of the ‘national resistance’.

Only later were the ‘Islamic resistance’ and Hizbollah launched. Hizbollah dealt with the LCP as a rival since the latter’s main social base was among Shiites and in southern Lebanon, that is among Hisbollah’s target constituency. Hizbollah built itself partially through fighting the LCP over this constituency and managed to prevail. In that, it was greatly helped by Iranian backing and by the fact that it played on the dominant ideological trend in the region that was in favour of Islamic fundamentalism since the 1970s, whereas the LCP lacked political boldness and was deeply affected by the unfolding crisis of the Soviet Union.

In the 1990s the LCP itself went into deep crisis, splitting and fragmenting. What remains is not completely invisible, but it is no longer in a position to play an important role-unfortunately, as it is the major left-wing grouping in the country. Hence, Lebanon is no exception to the general rule in the area: the historical failure of nationalist forces and the failure of the Left have created a vacuum that has been filled by Islamic fundamentalists.

och om karaktären på Hizbollah:

Even a plebeian group like Muqtada al Sadr’s organisation in Iraq is more socially threatening to the bourgeoisie than Hizbollah. The latter, of course, is radical in its opposition to Israel, as is usual with Islamic fundamentalist forces linked to Iran, but in Lebanese politics Hizbollah is integrated fully into the system. It has two ministers in the government that is dominated by Hariri-led US clients and it allies itself with quite reactionary figures.

True, it organises social services, but only as churches or charities do-they represent no social threat whatsoever to the bourgeois social order. There is not even a potential for that, given Hizbollah’s ideology, its structure, its close links to Iran and to Syria. Iran, Hizbollah’s model of society and state, is utterly bourgeois in its social structure. Whatever populist ranting Ahmadinejad (the Iranian president) may have given vent to, last year, in his electoral battle for the presidency against the capitalist Rafsanjani, these do not translate into any kind of concrete social measures.

In that respect, Chavez’s Venezuela is a far more progressive state: Iran is not a Muslim equivalent of Venezuela. Such equivalents existed in the Middle East in the 60s, but it is out of their defeat that Islamic fundamentalism was able to grow.

Kortfattat, Hizbollah är en borgeligt nationalistiska organisation utan några som helst vänsteruppfattningar och utan möjlighet att utvecklas åt vänster. Den enskilda vänstermänniskor i Sverige som tycks tro att Hizbollah är eller kan bli vänster är inget annat än grymt missledda.

Läs fler artiklar om Hizbollah och Libanon.
Läs fler artiklar av Gilbert Achcar
Läs också Göte Kildén, Sionismens förvandling – från dröm om fristad till globalpolitikens råskinn

Bloggat: Rawia Morra1, Rawia Morra2,
Borgarmedia: SVD1, SVD2, DN1, SVD3,
Andra bloggar om: Hizbollah, Borgerlig, Nationalistisk, Muslimsk, Shia, Libanon, Politik

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PS. Den här artikeln skrevs som en liten reaktion på debatten mellan mig och Hampus Eckerman i samband med ett inlägg om Andreas Malms DN-artikel om islamofobi. DS.

Relaterat:

1. Finns det en Hizbollah-vänster?
2. Kan vänstern stödja Hizbollah?
3. Libanons befolkning har rätt att försvara sig
4. Vilken järnridå?